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Abstract:  The bankruptcy of General Motors was 
historical, not only because of the size but also because 
of the political nature of the process.  The federal 
government was influential in the process which 
provided an outcome unique in the history of 
bankruptcy.  This paper explores the implications of the 
General Motors bankruptcy on stakeholders especially 
those who unknowingly were exposed to risk.  This 
paper puts into perspective how detrimental major 
bankruptcies can be, and it refutes the notion that only 
those who take a calculated financial risk are the only 
ones adversely affected by a bankruptcy.   
 




In 2008/2009, General Motors, one of the 
world’s largest automakers, was on the verge of 
financial meltdown.  The subsequent bankruptcy of 
General Motors was the fourth largest bankruptcy in 
U.S. history.  Since the bankruptcy’s beginning 
during the Bush administration, continuation during 
the Obama administration and carryover into the 
2012 presidential election, General Motors’ 
bankruptcy has been subject to political debate.  The 
sheer size of the bankruptcy and the ensuing “what-
if” debates makes sure that this bankruptcy will 
continue to be in the forefront of economic and 
political discussions for the unforeseeable future.  
Because of the importance of the GM bankruptcy, a 
closer look at the bankruptcy is worthwhile.   
 
2. General Motors Company History Prior to its 
Bankruptcy Filing 
For 77 years General Motors (“GM”) was the 
largest auto manufacturer in the world.  The brands it 
carries in the United States as of 2012 include Buick, 
Cadillac, Chevrolet and GMC.  It operates in over 
120 countries and manufactures vehicles in over 30 
countries, employing over 200,000 people 
worldwide.  General Motors is the largest original 
equipment manufacturer in the United States and the 
second largest in the world.   
General Motors was first organized on 
September 15, 1908 by William Durant.  Durant was 
first involved in the horse-drawn vehicle industry 
before he made a leap into the automobile industry.  
The first brand of automobile carried at the inception 
of the new company was Buick. 
 
 
Durant began expanding the company rapidly in the 
following decades.  General Motors acquired Olds 
motor Works (later known as “Oldsmobile”) in 1908.  
In 1909, General Motors acquired Cadillac for $55 
million.  General Motors acquired Oakland Motor 
Cars (later known as “Pontiac”) the next year.  In 
1911, General Motors formed General Motor Trucks 
(later known as “GMC”) from two existing 
companies it had previously purchased.   In 1918, 
General Motors acquired Chevrolet.  There was a 
deliberate philosophy behind the expansion and 
selection of companies to acquire – General Motors 
aimed to offer “a car for every purse and every 
purpose”.  The company then began to expand into 
acquiring companies in industries other than 
automobile manufacturing following the purchase of 
Chevrolet.  In 1919, General Motors purchased 
Dayton Wright, an airplane manufacturer. 
 The company’s rapid expansion did not slow 
entering the mid-1900s and it would continue all the 
way to the turn of the 21st century.  General Motors 
would enter into multiple joint ventures, partnerships 
and investments in overseas companies in addition to 
expanding domestically.  In 1943, the company 
acquired Yellow Truck and Coach.  In 1959, General 
Motors would form a defense systems division which 
would design and develop weapons systems for the 
military. 
 By the 1960s General Motors had a 50% market 
share of the automobile manufacturing industry, 
representing the largest market share in the world, 
and it would only continue to expand its brands and 
models.  Early in the 1980s it acquired Electronic 
Data Systems and Hughes Electronics.  In 1989, it 
purchased 50% of Saab and would acquire the rest of 
Saab in 2000.  In later years it also acquired major 
brands such as Hummer and Saturn.   
 The years that marked major expansion for 
General Motors also marked a period of a shift in 
consumer needs.  Increased gas prices in the latter 
half of the 20th century created a need for smaller, 
more fuel efficient cars.  General Motors had been 
continuing to emphasize production of large trucks 
and sport utility vehicles but would ultimately see the 
need to begin to adapt its business model and begin 
investing in energy and fuel efficiency in its vehicles.   
 In 1971, General Motors produced an engine 
that could run on no lead, or unleaded, gasoline.  
General Motors also produced the world’s first 
catalytic converter in 1974.  In the 1980’s General 
       DOI: 10.5176/2010-4804_2.3.236 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.2 No.3, March 2013
©The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
180
Motors entered into a strategic partnership which 
included Saturn and Toyota which became known as 
NUMMI, a joint venture focused on the production of 
small, fuel efficient cars.  Ultimately though, the 
efforts of General Motors during this time period 
proved to be reactive to the consumer trends rather 
than proactive, in contrast with its Japanese and 
German competitors who began producing smaller 
and more fuel efficient cars much earlier.  General 
Motors ultimately began to lose market share and 
found itself trying to find new ways to revolutionize 
fuel efficiency to once again regain its market share. 
 General Motors then turned to developing 
hybrid systems after the turn of the 21st century in 
order to capitalize on a different market.  In 2005, it 
produced its first hybrid system which utilized a belt-
alternator.  The company also began developing 
technology for fuel cells and created the world’s first 
fuel cell powered truck, which it introduced to the 
United States military service.  In 2007, General 
Motors introduced a prototype for the Chevrolet Volt, 
a car model for citizens rather than the military, 
which utilized fuel cell technology. 
 Despite all of General Motors’ efforts, the 
United States auto manufacturing industry as a whole 
declined following the economic trouble in the 
United States in the 21st century and General Motors 
was not sheltered from its effects.  In 2008, the 
industry lost 50% of its sales and over 400,000 jobs 
[23]. 
 A major concern of the United States and its 
government was the effect that a collapse of its 
domestic auto manufacturing industry would have on 
the United States economy.  On November 5, 2008 
the Center for Automotive Research, a Detroit-based 
consulting group, predicted that if one of the three 
major domestic auto manufacturers (Chrysler, 
General Motors and Ford) were to fail, the result 
could mean as many as 3 million jobs in the United 
States would be lost, taking into account the effect 
that such a failure could have on parts suppliers, the 
market and possibly the financial success of the other 
two manufacturers [14].   
 During its domestic economic crisis in 2008, the 
United States government enacted the Troubled 
Assets Relief Program (“TARP”), which set aside 
billions of dollars in funds to invest in failing 
companies in order to provide them with the capital 
necessary to survive hard times and become viable 
during a time when financing was difficult to obtain.  
In response to the troubles of the auto manufacturing 
industry the United States Government set aside 
TARP funds specifically for domestic bailouts of 
auto manufacturing companies and on December 19, 
2008 the Auto Industry Financing program was 
established to prop up the auto industry and its 
financing arms. 
 Despite its efforts to recapture the automobile 
manufacturing industry market by investing in fuel 
efficient cars, hybrid and fuel cell technology 
General Motors was still declining sharply by the end 
of 2008.  After having a market share of as much as 
50% in the 1960s and 45% in the 1980’s its market 
share plummeted to less than 20% as of 2009[15].  It 
struggled to compete with foreign competitors for 
multiple reasons.  Primarily, General Motors did not 
provide an affordable model line for consumers 
consistent enough with their needs during a time of 
rising oil prices.  Also chief among reasons for its 
decline was the cost structure of General Motors’ 
business model.  Its labor was, and still is, highly 
unionized with the majority of its workforce being 
part of the United Auto Workers (“UAW”).   
 As part of its collective bargaining agreements 
with the UAW General Motors takes on medical 
benefits and pension obligations owed to the 
employees and retirees of the UAW, creating massive 
liabilities for the company.  Its foreign competitors 
have a much more advantageous labor-cost structure 
because governments in foreign countries provide 
medical and retirement benefits for employees in 
those markets, thus the responsibility of these 
benefits does not come from the pockets of foreign 
competitors.  The healthcare costs that General 
Motors was responsible for by the end of 2008 added 
an additional $1,500 to the cost of manufacturing 
each vehicle that it sold.  General Motors also, as part 
of its collective bargaining agreements with the 
UAW, has funding obligations for an independent 
Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association 
(“VEBA”) trust which administers medical and 
pension benefits to retired UAW employees. These 
funding obligations proved extremely burdensome 
and unmanageable for General Motors at the end of 
2008 when the company had a $20 billion funding 
obligation [18].  
   By the end of 2008 General Motors was in 
such poor condition that it was widely known that the 
company would have to liquidate if it did not receive 
any assistance.  The company posted a pre-tax net 
loss of $30.86 billion during 2008, and in the prior 
year posted a pre-tax loss of $43.297 billion.  
According to its balance sheet, the company had only 
$91.047 billion in total assets compared to $176.387 
billion in liabilities.  It had $73.91 billion in current 
liabilities against only $13.966 billion in cash and 
marketable securities.  The condition of the company 
was so poor that the auditors for its 2008 annual 
report, Deloitte & Touche, LLP, issued a “going 
concern” opinion indicating the firm’s belief that 
General Motors could not continue operations for the 
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foreseeable future and essentially predicting a 
collapse for its client [10].  There was a clear 
liquidity crisis for General Motors; it had incredible 
liabilities mounted against few assets and negative 
equity.  It desperately needed financing but its 
financial condition was so dire that it was having 
trouble gathering credit or equity from any 
institution.  
 In 2008, the United States government realized 
it was imperative to make funds from the Auto 
Industry Financing Program available for General 
Motors.  General Motors was, at the time, its largest 
domestic original equipment manufacturer in the 
country and employed about 91,000 persons 
domestically.  This number does not include the 
thousands of people employed by the parts suppliers 
to whom General Motors, at the time, was making 
annual payments equal to about $50 billion.  There 
were 600 domestic automobile parts manufacturers 
for whom General Motors contracts made up at least 
30% of revenue [15].  There is little doubt that had 
General Motors been forced to liquidate then these 
600 suppliers would have been in dire jeopardy, and 
thousands of other suppliers would have lost business 
and been forced to downsize, the result of which 
would mean hundreds of thousands of jobs lost in the 
United States.   
 General Motors, unable to find financing from 
other sources, went before the United States 
government, headed by President George W. Bush, in 
December of 2008 to plead for assistance under the 
Auto Industry Financing Program, originally asking 
for $18 billion in order to remain a viable company.  
General Motors presented a viability plan to the 
United States Government at this time to prove that 
the funds would help them remain competitive and 
ensuring that funds received would not go towards 
futile efforts.  The plan called for efforts to invest in 
increased production of smaller, more fuel-efficient 
cars, a reduction in the number of its over 6,000 
United States dealerships and negotiations to re-
structure its collective bargaining agreement with the 
UAW.  The United States Government deemed this 
viability plan unsatisfactory, however, primarily 
because the plan did not address specific objectives 
on how to accomplish its proposals; it was deemed 
too vague. 
 Recognizing the necessity of propping up 
General Motors and providing financial assistance, 
the United States Treasury granted the company a 
Treasury Prepetition Loan anyway on December 31, 
2008 for $13.4 billion – less than the originally 
requested $18 billion.   
The Treasury Prepetition Loan of $13.4 billion would 
be made available to General Motors in three 
installments: The first $4 billion would be available 
immediately, $5.4 billion would be available in 
January 2009 and the remaining $4 billion would be 
available February 17, 2009.  There were conditions 
tied to the loan, as part of the terms of the loan, 
which required several mandated steps for General 
Motors to follow which the government believed 
would help it achieve viability.  The loan specifically 
stated that if by March 31, 2009 (approximately 3 
months after the loan was granted) a designee of the 
President of the United States had not issued a 
certification that General Motors had created a 
sufficient plan to take all the necessary steps to 
achieve long-term viability as outlined by the terms 
of the loan, then the entire $13.4 billion loan would 
automatically become payable to the United States 
Treasury 30 days later [15].  Considering the massive 
current obligations of General Motors, its lack of 
liquidity and inability to obtain outside financing, not 
obtaining such a certification would essentially mean 
that the government would force General Motors into 
liquidation.  
 By the time General Motors was due for the 
third payment of its Treasury Prepetition Loan a new 
president took office for the United States, Barack 
Obama.  Determining the certification of the viability 
plan General Motors would submit at the end of 
March 2009 would fall on the administration of this 
new president.  On February 15, 2011 Barack Obama 
announced the creation of an interagency Presidential 
Task Force on the Auto Industry which would be 
designated to review the viability plan.  This task 
force was chaired by Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner and National Economic Council Director 
Lawrence Summers.  The President then created the 
Treasury Auto Team which had the primary 
responsibility of helping evaluate the restructuring 
plan General Motors would submit as well as 
negotiating terms of any further assistance the United 
States Treasury would provide General Motors.  The 
Treasury Auto Team was headed by Rob Bloom, a 
former investment banker and Steven Rattner, a 
cofounder of The Quadrangle Group, a private equity 
firm. 
 On February 17, 2009 General Motors 
submitted its new plan for viability as conditioned by 
the Treasury Prepetition Loan.  The plan General 
Motors submitted called for reducing the number of 
plants in the United States from 47 to 32 by the year 
2014 and the number of United States employees 
from 92,000 to 72,000 by the year 2012.  The plan 
also called for shedding unprofitable brands carried 
by General Motors in the United States, specifically 
Saab, Hummer and Saturn.  Sixteen hundred and fifty 
General Motors dealerships were also planned to be 
terminated by 2014 as part of the plan [23].  General 
Motors claimed that these restructuring efforts would 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.2 No.3, March 2013
©The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
182
allow it to be a leaner company and give it the ability 
to invest more money into its profitable assets. 
 After careful review the Obama administration, 
with assistance in its decision from its appointed task 
forces, rejected the viability plan on March 30, 2009 
claiming that it was not aggressive enough, failed to 
answer major questions and did not merit taxpayer 
assistance.  However, rather than making the loan 
fully payable in 30 days from March 31, 2011, the 
president extended the deadline for General Motors 
to create an aggressive and sufficient plan by 60 days 
and agreed to provide General Motors with working 
capital as assistance which it would need to continue 
to operate for these 60 days, provided that General 
Motors was actively taking steps to create this 
aggressive plan.  It was at this point that the President 
indicated his inclination that General Motors consider 
utilizing the United States Bankruptcy Code to 
accomplish this innovative plan.  He indicated the 
need for a “fresh start.” 
It was with this decision by the Obama 
administration that General Motors began preparing 
to undergo an aggressive restructuring.  The company 
from this point forward would need to focus on 
negotiating with its largest creditors and create a 
prepackaged bankruptcy plan to quickly go through 
the United States bankruptcy process.  
 
3. Details of the General Motors Restructuring 
Process 
After the presidential task force under the direction of 
Barack Obama declined to certify the viability plan 
presented by General Motors, the company was 
forced to begin planning and executing an aggressive 
restructuring plan.  The new restructuring efforts 
which General Motors planned to execute involved 
utilizing Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code, and the process necessary to implement such a 
plan involved negotiating with its largest creditors in 
an effort to prepackage a plan of reorganization 
which would ensure the quickest and most efficient 
bankruptcy procedure possible in order to quickly 
reorganize and restructure the company. 
 The United States Government agreed to 
provide General Motors with working capital for 60 
days while it planned and created a new restructuring 
plan.  Because the working capital for operations 
would run out after this window, General Motors 
would have to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on June 1, 2009.  Thus, General Motors 
would need to complete the prepackaging process by 
this date.  The restructure that General Motors 
planned to execute involved leveraging subsection 
363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code which 
allows debtors to sell their assets while undergoing 
bankruptcy procedures.  General Motors planned to 
use subsection 363 in a manner similar to companies 
such as Chrysler where it would sell substantially all 
of its assets to a purchaser, give consideration to 
certain of its creditors in provisions of the sale, and 
then confirm a liquidation plan under Chapter 11 
where the consideration General Motors received 
from the subsection 363 sale would be distributed 
among the remaining creditors.  The purchasing 
company would then become the restructured 
General Motors.  There were two major creditors that 
General Motors would have to negotiate with in order 
to successfully prepackage a bankruptcy plan.  The 
largest secured debt against General Motors at the 
time was a $20 billion funding obligation to the 
UAW administered independent VEBA trust [18].  
The other major creditor was general unsecured 
bondholders to which it had $27.2 billion in 
outstanding debt [30]. 
 The additional working capital provided by the 
United States Government came at two major points.  
On April 24, 2009 the United States Treasury 
extended an additional $2 billion to General Motors 
as additional financing under the Treasury Prepetition 
Loan [13].  Then on May 20, 2009 General Motors 
borrowed an additional $4 billion under the loan from 
the Treasury. Combined with the aid of $13.4 billion 
given to General Motors on December 31, 2008 the 
total financing extended to General Motors by the 
United States Treasury was $19.4 billion.  All of the 
financing provided to General Motors was on a 
senior secured basis [15].  One of the conditions 
provided by the United States Government for the 
additional financing received was that current Chief 
Executive Officer of General Motors, Rick Wagoner, 
was forced to resign.  Fritz Henderson would become 
the Chief Executive Officer of the company as it 
went through its restructuring efforts. 
 On May 8, 2009 General Motors announced the 
results of its first quarter of operations for the 2009 
fiscal year.  The results showed poor performance, 
similar to its annual report for the year 2008, and 
further highlighted the need for General Motors to 
undertake its aggressive restructuring plan.  In the 
first quarter of 2009 General Motors showed a net 
loss before income taxes and equity income of $6.061 
billion.  The total operating loss for the quarter was 
$5.662 billion.   At the end of the first quarter 
General Motors showed that it had only $82.29 
billion in total assets against $172.81 billion in total 
liabilities.  It had $36.776 billion in current assets 
while having $80.798 billion in current liabilities.  
General Motors’ quarterly revenue had decreased by 
almost $20 billion compared to the first quarter of 
2008, from $43.838 billion in the first quarter of 2008 
to only $22.431 billion in the first quarter of 2009, a 
total decrease of over 47%.   To further highlight the 
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company’s liquidity crisis, General Motors had a 
deficit in cash flows from operating activities of over 
$9.39 billion in the first quarter of 2009; it had only a 
$1.5 billion deficit in cash flows from operating 
activities in the first quarter of 2008 [11]. 
 After the first quarter results were announced, 
Albert Koch of AlixPartners, LLP performed a 
liquidation analysis of General Motors in order to 
conclude how the company’s assets would be 
distributed if it were to be forced into liquidation 
without restructuring and what value each of General 
Motors’ creditors would be able to recover in the case 
of liquidation.  The analysis considered the effects 
assuming that General Motors had to file for 
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code on June 1, 2009, rather than 
protection under Chapter 11 where the company 
could restructure.  The results of the analysis 
concluded that much more value for creditors would 
be recovered if General Motors was able to 
restructure rather than liquidate. 
 In the liquidation analysis, AlixPartners pointed 
to the fact that liquidation by General Motors would 
be one of the largest and most complicated in United 
States history and then added that it would be the 
largest domestic original equipment manufacturer in 
United States history to liquidate.  There would be 
almost no precedent for the proceedings of the 
liquidation, and thus AlixPartners concluded that it 
could take two years before the liquidation actually 
concluded and distributions to creditors took place.   
AlixPartners also predicted that such a large 
liquidation would be tremendously expensive and the 
costs associated would be between $2.0 and $2.7 
billion, leaving value of only about $6.5 and $9.7 
billion to be recovered by creditors [2].  
 The liquidation analysis outlined in detail that 
only a fraction of the value for each of General 
Motors’ assets (as listed per the balance sheet in the 
form 10-Q General Motors filed at the end of the first 
quarter of 2009) would be recovered in the 
liquidation.   General Motors had a net book value of 
accounts receivable totaling $1.3 billion, but in 
liquidation it was predicted that only $500 to $600 
million of that value would be recovered.  Inventory 
had a book value of $3.2 billion, but the liquidation 
analysis predicted that only $600 to $900 million of 
this value would be recovered.  Property Plant and 
Equipment was listed at a book value of $18 billion 
which was predicted in liquidation to only yield a 
$1.3 to $2.1 billion recovery.  Other Assets totaled 
$4.10 billion in book value and the liquidation 
recovery was predicted at only $200 to $400 million. 
 The liquidation analysis broke down the many 
costs that would be associated with the liquidation.   
To liquidate under Chapter 7 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code a case trustee would need to be 
appointed by the bankruptcy court to manage the 
liquidation and oversee the distribution.  This trustee 
would have fees equal to 1% of the total proceeds of 
the liquidation, according to AlixPartners.  The 
liquidation also would require professional 
fiduciaries such as attorneys, accountants, brokers, 
liquidators and other professionals hired by both 
General Motors and its creditors.  AlixPartners 
estimated the total costs of these professionals at 
1.5% of the total liquidation proceeds.  Wind-down 
costs would be another major cost category of the 
liquidation.  These costs include those required while 
discontinuing the operations of the business.  An 
example would be the cost of the corporate 
accountants who would need to close all of the open 
books of General Motors, or the engineering costs 
that would be incurred when valuing intellectual 
property in order to maximize recovery.  Wind-down 
costs were estimated at $1.8 to $2.5 billion [2]. 
 Most importantly, the liquidation analysis 
predicted the value that would be recovered by each 
group of General Motors creditors.  The United 
States Treasury had provided General Motors with 
almost $20 billion in financing and the liquidation 
analysis predicted that the Treasury would only be 
able to recover between 12% and 28% of its 
financing, or between $2.6 and $4.9 billion.  Other 
senior secured credit which was outstanding for 
General Motors included a revolving credit facility 
and a secured term loan totaling $5.4 billion.  The 
estimated recovery for this senior secured debt was 
between $3.1 and $3.9 billion.  There was $116 
billion in general unsecured debt held by General 
Motors including $27.2 billion in general unsecured 
debt from general unsecured bondholders. The 
liquidation analysis predicted that there would be 
absolutely no recovery for these creditors [2].  
 The major creditors of General Motors 
understood the need to allow the company to 
reorganize in order to maximize their incremental 
recoveries.  The UAW was very willing to negotiate 
with General Motors in order to reduce the $20 
billion funding obligation General Motors had to its 
independent VEBA trust and to also restructure its 
collective bargaining agreement to lower the labor 
cost for General Motors.  These negotiations were 
imperative to the viability of any restructuring 
efforts.  On May 21, 2009, after a long negotiation 
process, General Motors was able to reach a deal 
with the UAW.  The deal was largely a swap of debt 
for equity.  General Motors agreed to fund a newly 
established independent VEBA trust managed by the 
UAW after General Motors restructured.  The new 
independent VEBA trust would take the place of the 
old independent VEBA trust to which General 
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Motors owed a $20 billion funding obligation and the 
new independent VEBA trust would fund the same 
retiree benefits as the old independent VEBA trust.  
The new independent VEBA trust would be funded 
by three notes payable which totaled $2.5 billion,  $6 
billion worth of 9% perpetual preferred stock in the 
restructured General Motors, a 17.5% ownership 
stake in the restructured General Motors and warrants 
to purchase an additional 2.5%.  The UAW also 
entered into a new collective bargaining agreement 
with General Motors which reduced the labor cost 
structure of the company [21]. 
 After coming to terms with the UAW, the major 
creditor General Motors had left to strike an 
agreement with in order to create a prepackaged 
bankruptcy plan and ensure a speedy restructuring 
process was its general unsecured bondholders which 
held $27.2 billion in general unsecured debt.  Coming 
to terms with bondholders would be the toughest task 
for General Motors in its restructuring efforts because 
of the dilution of the ownership of bonds.  Owners of 
General Motors unsecured bonds included both large 
institutional purchasers as well as individual 
purchasers.  For the purposes of creating a 
prepackaged bankruptcy, General Motors would need 
approval from bondholders holding at least half the 
number of outstanding bonds and two- thirds the 
amount of outstanding bonds.  On June 1, 2009 
General Motors was due to pay $1 billion in interest 
payments on its outstanding general unsecured bonds 
which it announced that it did not have the liquidity 
to actually pay [17]. 
 Institutional bondholders making up roughly 
20% of the number of the outstanding general 
unsecured bonds formed an ad-hoc committee which 
would negotiate terms of a deal with General Motors.  
The first deal that General Motors offered to general 
unsecured bondholders was a debt for equity deal in 
which General Motors offered bondholders a 10% 
equity interest in General Motors after it restructured.  
All general unsecured bondholders were given ballots 
to vote on the deal which they could mail in.  Only 
15% of general unsecured bondholders agreed to the 
original deal by ballot after the ad-hoc committee 
dissented and publically encouraged bondholders to 
not vote to agree to the deal [26]. 
 The ad-hoc committee released public 
statements in which it discouraged bondholders from 
voting to agree to the deal: 
We believe the offer to be a blatant 
disregard of fairness for the bondholders 
who have funded this company and 
amounts to using taxpayer money to show 
political favoritism of one creditor over 
another…Today’s posturing makes it clear 
that the company and the auto task force 
would rather discount the thousands of 
individual investors and retirees who own 
GM bonds than undergo earnest 
negotiations [24]. 
 General Motors would continue to negotiate 
with the ad-hoc committee of bondholders and on 
Thursday, May 28, 2009 the committee and General 
Motors came to terms on an agreement which the ad-
hoc committee accepted.  The new deal gave 
bondholders a 10% ownership share of General 
Motors after it would restructure, as in the original 
deal; however, the new deal also gave bondholders 
warrants to purchase an additional 15% of the 
restructured company at a discounted price.  As a 
condition to the deal none of the warrants 
bondholders received could be exercised until the 
value of the restructured General Motors became at 
least $15 billion.  Combined with the 15% of 
bondholders who accepted the previous deal, a total 
of 35% of bondholders had accepted the newly 
negotiated deal as of Thursday, May 28, 2009, but 
over 50% of bondholders were required to vote to 
agree to the deal by Saturday May 30, 2009 by ballot 
in order for the deal to be effective as a prepackaged 
bankruptcy plan [30].  Ultimately, 54% of 
bondholders making up a total of over two-thirds of 
the value of outstanding General Motors general 
unsecured bonds would vote to agree to the plan.  As 
part of the deal, the accepting bondholders agreed not 
to challenge the restructuring plan during bankruptcy 
proceedings [25].  
 General unsecured bondholders would have to 
wait considerably longer than the UAW to receive 
their ownership in the restructured General Motors.  
The deal with bondholders was set in such a way that 
the 10% ownership share in the restructured General 
Motors and the warrants to purchase the additional 
equity would be given by the purchasing entity that 
would be restructuring as General Motors to the 
General Motors that would be liquidating in 
bankruptcy as consideration for the subsection 363 
purchase of General Motors’ assets.  This equity 
would then be distributed to the bondholders after the 
liquidation plan was confirmed. 
 With agreements with the UAW and 
bondholders in place, General Motors officially filed 
a petition for bankruptcy protection on June 1, 2009, 
as originally planned, under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code with the Southern District of 
New York.  General Motors would pursue the 
originally planned prepackaged bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization whereby its assets would be sold to a 
purchasing company under subsection 363 of the 
bankruptcy code which would restructure itself as 
General Motors, while the old General Motors would 
be left to liquidate under Chapter 11.  The purchasing 
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entity was formed by the United States Treasury and 
it was officially titled Vehicle Acquisition Holdings, 
LLC [15].   After purchasing all of General Motors’ 
assets, Vehicle Acquisition Holdings, LLC would 
change its name to General Motors Company and 
would represent the restructured General Motors.  
The General Motors Company that filed for 
bankruptcy and would be selling its assets to Vehicle 
Acquisition Holdings changed its name to Motors 
Liquidation Company.  Motors Liquidation Company 
would remain in bankruptcy after the subsection 363 
sale of its assets with the purpose of liquidating under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and settling all 
claims against General Motors that would not be 
settled by the purchasing company [31].  For 
purposes of simplicity for the duration of this report, 
Motors Liquidation Company will be referred to as 
“Old General Motors” and Vehicle Acquisition 
Holdings (subsequently to be referred to as General 
Motors Company) will be referred to as “New 
General Motors”. 
 The United States Treasury provided $30.1 
billion as financing to create New General Motors, 
bringing its total aid to the General Motors 
restructure to almost $50 billion.  The Governments 
of Canada and Ontario also agreed to invest a total of 
$9.1 billion in New General Motors in order to help it 
achieve viability.  This additional financing came on 
the condition of a speedy reorganization and required 
that the subsection 363 sale where New General 
Motors would be acquiring Old General Motors’ 
assets was approved by the bankruptcy court in the 
Southern District of New York on an expedited basis 
by July 10, 2009.  The rationale behind this need for 
a speedy sale was that operations were continued 
under the General Motors brand name during the 
bankruptcy proceedings and funded by Old General 
Motors, who no longer had the finances to keep 
operations sustained for a long period of time.  
Operations might have ceased completely for a 
period of time during the bankruptcy process if the 
purchase was not completed on a timely basis.  
Ultimately the subsection 363 sale would be 
approved and confirmed by Judge Robert E. Gerber 
on July 5, 2009 [15]. 
 The New General Motors would have the 
following ownership structure when it completed the 
purchase on July 5, 2009: The United States Treasury 
owned 60.8% of the company, the UAW owned 
17.5%, the Governments of Canada and Ontario 
owned 11.7%, and Old General Motors Company 
owned 10% (and this equity interest was reserved for 
distribution to general unsecured bondholders after 
Old General Motors confirmed a plan of liquidation) 
[27].  New General Motors was the only bidder in the 
subsection 363 sale, thus it was the winner of the sale 
because there were no competing bids.  As 
consideration for the sale, New General Motors 
offered the following to Old General Motors: 
i. A credit bid by the U.S. and Canadian 
governments of the majority of the 
outstanding debt held by each entity. 
ii. The assumption by New General Motors of 
approximately $6.75 billion of Old General 
Motors’ liabilities. 
iii. 10% of the post-closing outstanding shares of 
New General Motors (to be distributed to 
general unsecured bondholders). 
iv. Two warrants for the additional purchase of 
7.5% equity each in New General Motors (to 
be distributed to general unsecured 
bondholders). 
v. Agreements to take on additional liabilities of 
Old General Motors. 
Assets sold under subsection 363 of the bankruptcy 
code are sold free and clear of any liens or previously 
liability.  The only liabilities that are transferred from 
the selling entity to the purchasing entity are those 
that are specifically agreed on by the purchasing 
entity.  In the subsection 363 sale that occurred 
between Old General Motors and New General 
Motors during the Chapter 11 bankruptcy, all of the 
assets of Old General Motors were sold to New 
General Motors except for the following items: 
i. $1.175 billion in cash or cash equivalents 
ii. Equity interest in the Saturn brand 
iii. Certain real and personal property 
iv. Bankruptcy avoidance actions 
v. Certain employee benefit plans 
vi. Certain restricted cash and cash receivables 
All of the liabilities Old General Motors held before 
the subsection 363 sale took place would remain with 
Old General Motors after the subsection 363 sale.  
Only the following liabilities of General Motors’ 
assets would be transferred to New General Motors 
as part of the purchase: 
i. Substantially all product liability claims that 
arise from previously purchased General 
Motors products after the closing of the 
subsection 363 sale, regardless of when they 
were purchased, provided that the claims 
arise after the sale closes. 
ii. All product warranty obligations of Old General 
Motors. 
iii. All employment related obligations for all 
UAW employees. 
There were several liabilities that were specifically 
held by Old General Motors in the purchase 
agreement and would not be transferred to New 
General Motors.  As part of the purchase agreement 
between the two entities New General Motors refused 
to take on these specific liabilities: 
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i. Product liability claims, arising from General 
Motors products, which existed prior to the 
subsection 363 sale of assets. 
ii. Liabilities for claims arising from employee 
exposure to asbestos. 
iii. Liabilities to third parties for contract tort. 
iv. Liabilities related to any implied warrantees 
from common law. 
v. Employment related claims not arising from 
UAW employees [15].  
New General Motors also guaranteed offers of 
employment to all UAW and non-unionized 
employees of Old General Motors as part of the 
subsection 363 sale.  Essentially this meant that 
employees that were part of non-UAW unions were 
not guaranteed jobs after the sale took place.  New 
General Motors would also assume the new 
collective bargaining agreement with the UAW 
where some labor costs were cut and a new 
independent VEBA trust was set up to replace the old 
independent VEBA trust for benefits to UAW 
retirees.  The new trust would be funded by New 
General Motors. 
 In its approval hearing, the subsection 363 sale 
was met with several objections by different classes 
and groups of claimholders against Old General 
Motors which Judge Robert E. Gerber had to address 
in his decision.  The main groups who posed 
objections to the sale included: the F&D Bondholders 
Committee, an ad hoc committee of Old General 
Motors general unsecured bondholders which 
collectively held about 0.1% of its outstanding bonds; 
tort litigants holding outstanding product liability 
claims against Old General Motors; tort litigants 
holding outstanding asbestos exposure liability 
claims against Old General Motors; and non-UAW 
union representatives acting on behalf of their retirees 
who were former employees of Old General Motors. 
 The F&D Bondholders Committee was headed 
by Oliver Addison Parker.  The committee and Mr. 
Parker argued that subsection 363 of the bankruptcy 
code was being utilized improperly.  The committee 
contended that subsection 363 was not meant for 
selling substantially all of a debtor’s assets and that 
the action of distributing that great  a proportion of a 
debtor’s assets should be reserved for the 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.  
The committee was contending that the subsection 
363 sale represented an impermissible sub rosa plan 
– a plan of reorganization by a debtor that 
circumvents the conventional bankruptcy process and 
attempts to not adhere to the normal requirements.  
 The F&D Bondholders Committee also 
complained about the way that the purchaser only 
took on certain liabilities and contracts held by Old 
General Motors instead of all contracts, further 
contending that the plan was a sub rosa plan.  There 
were three contracts which the committee specifically 
argued [15]: 
i. The purchaser’s assumption of all of the seller’s 
contracts with suppliers 
ii. The guarantees of employment offers by the 
purchaser to all non-unionized and UAW 
personnel of Old General Motors 
iii. The purchaser’s assumption of a modified 
collective bargaining agreement with the 
UAW, including the obligations to fund a 
new Independent VEBA trust. 
Finally, the F&D Bondholders Committee 
contended that the nature and extent of the United 
States Treasury’s Treasury Prepetition Loan given to 
Old General Motors as financing represented equity 
more than it did debt, and thus the funds should be 
re-characterized as equity for the purposes of 
bankruptcy proceedings.  The committee concluded 
that the United States Treasury’s claims against Old 
General Motors should be considered subordinate to 
the claims of the general unsecured bondholders 
because general unsecured debt receives a higher 
priority under United States bankruptcy law than 
equity.  Additionally, the committee contended that 
because the financing given by the United States 
Treasury was equity, rather than debt, the Treasury 
had no right to credit bid as consideration for the 
subsection 363 sale, thus bringing the value of sale’s 
consideration down considerably. 
 Tort litigants who had product liability claims 
and asbestos exposure claims outstanding against Old 
General Motors objected to the limit of successor 
liability granted to New General Motors when 
purchasing the assets of Old General Motors.  The 
litigants contended that the purchasing entity should 
not be able to purchase the assets of Old General 
Motors without having to accept the product liability 
responsibilities that Old General Motors had, and 
thus the product liability and asbestos exposure 
litigants should be able to exert their claims onto 
New General Motors.   
 A committee representing the product liability 
litigants claimed that the wording of the bankruptcy 
code under subsection 363 (f) specifically permits 
assets to be sold free of interests but makes no 
mention of being sold free from claims.  Further, the 
product liability litigants contended subsection 1114 
(c) of the bankruptcy code provides evidence that 
Congress specifically wished to exclude claims from 
subsection 363 (f).  Subsection 1141 (f) of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code outlines regulations for 
property distributed in a Chapter 11 plan 
confirmation and both the words interests and claims 
are specifically used in that subsection. Subsection 
1141 (c) states “property dealt with by the plan is free 
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and clear of all claims and interests… in the debtor” 
[15 p.55].  The committee of product liability 
litigants contended that because Congress specifically 
chose to include the terms interest and claims in a 
subsection addressing property distributed after 
confirming a Chapter 11 plan, but specifically 
excluded the word claims in subsection 363 (f), it 
should be interpreted that Congress did not intend for 
property sold in a subsection 363 sale to be sold free 
of claims, only interests. Thus successor liability 
should not be limited on the assets New General 
Motors purchased from Old General Motors and New 
General Motors should be responsible for the claims 
of the product liability and asbestos exposure 
litigants.  
 Committees which represented the retirees of 
three different non-UAW unions presented objections 
to the subsection 363 sale.  These non-UAW unions 
objected to provisions of the sale which stated that 
New General Motors would not be taking on the 
obligations that Old General Motors owed to their 
retirees.  These committees all submitted affidavits 
from their retirees describing how difficult it is for 
their retirees to get by without their entitled medical 
benefits and how some who do not qualify for 
Medicare have no medical insurance if it is not 
provided by New General Motors.  These unions 
based their case on regulations mandated in 
subsection 1114 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code which outline a process that debtors in 
possession must adhere to before they are allowed to 
either modify or neglect retiree benefits.  The 
regulations in subsection 1114 call for a debtor to 
gain approval from a bankruptcy court before 
modifications or lack of payment of retiree benefits 
can occur, and before the debtor can go before a court 
for approval the debtor must negotiate in good faith 
with a committee representing the retirees to try and 
compromise on reduced benefits which are 
acceptable for both parties.  The committees 
contended that both Old General Motors and New 
General Motors did not first confer or negotiate with 
these non-UAW union retirees before Old General 
Motors sent a notification to each of these unions 
explaining that their retiree benefits would no longer 
be honored.  
 There were also smaller objections to the 
subsection 363 sale of assets from less prominent 
objectors.  Most notable were objections from 
environmental advocates that New General Motors 
would not be bound to environmental clean-up 
responsibilities which Old General Motors had.  The 
most notable among the environmental advocates 
was the Attorney General of the State of New York.  
Similar to the claims of the product liability and 
asbestos exposure litigants, the arguments of the 
environmental advocates rested under the theory of 
successor liability; that the claims against the assets 
of Old General Motors should be carried to New 
General Motors.  These environmental advocates 
were also concerned with whether New General 
Motors was going to be required to comply with 
environmental law after purchasing the assets from 
Old General Motors. 
 Judge Robert E. Gerber ruled against all 
objections and approved the subsection 363 sale of 
Old General Motors’ assets to New General Motors 
on July 5, 2009.  After New General Motors acquired 
Old General Motors’ assets, New General Motors 
became the restructured General Motors.  Old 
General Motors remained a debtor in bankruptcy and 
continued the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings for 
the next two years pursuing a plan of liquidation.  On 
March 18, 2011 Old General Motors (Motors 
Liquidation Company) filed its Second Amended 
Joint Chapter 11 Plan. That plan was approved on 
March 29, 2011 and became effective on March 31, 
2011.  After the liquidating plan became effective, 
general unsecured bondholders became entitled to the 
equity which they had agreed upon in the 
prepackaged bankruptcy plan.  The securities which 
general unsecured bondholders previously held were 
terminated on March 31, 2011.  On April 21, 2011 
general unsecured bondholders received their initial 
distribution of New General Motors stock (which by 
that time had already gone public) [31].  
 There were different classes of general 
unsecured bonds outstanding against Old General 
Motors, each with different interest rates and 
maturity dates.  Depending on the type of bond held, 
general unsecured bondholders received a 
distribution of up to 4 shares of New General Motors 
Stock per every $1,000 dollars of bonds they held.  
Stock in New General Motors was trading publically 
at a high of $31 dollar per share on the day of 
distribution [32].  Depending on the number of shares 
of common stock distributed to a particular 
bondholder, bondholders received a maximum value 
of up to $124 per $1,000 of bonds they held, plus the 
value of warrants that the bondholders received.  Two 
types of warrants were distributed to unsecured 
bondholders and up to 4 warrants of each type per 
$1,000 of bonds held were distributed, depending 
again on the type of bond a particular bondholder 
had.  Class A Warrants gave bondholders the right to 
purchase New General Motors stock at $10 per share 
and Class B warrants gave bondholders the right to 
purchase New General Motors stock at $18.33 per 
share [16]. 
 
4. General Motors Post Restructure 
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After the subsection 363 sale was executed, New 
General Motors changed its name from “Vehicle 
Acquisition Holdings” to “General Motors 
Company” (subsequently in this section, New 
General Motors will be referred to as “General 
Motors”).  After completing its restructuring efforts 
the company would reemerge with only four of its 
most profitable major brands in North America: 
Buick, GMC, Chevrolet and Cadillac.  The other 
brands it carried in North America were either sold or 
wound down.  In 2009, General Motors decided to 
wind down its Saturn and Pontiac brands.  In 2010, 
General Motors sold its Saab brand to Spyker Cars.  
Also in 2010, General Motors had agreed to an initial 
sale of its Hummer brand, but the sale was eventually 
rejected and unsuccessful, resulting in a wind down 
of Hummer’s operations. 
General Motors emerged from the subsection 363 
sale of assets a much leaner company with a much 
more competitive cost structure.  It cut its workforce 
by over 20% from the end of the 2008 fiscal year to 
the end of the 2009 fiscal year.  General Motors also 
reduced its number of manufacturing plants.  It had 
47 manufacturing plants at the end of the first quarter 
of 2009 before the company filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection, but after coming out of 
Chapter 11 through the subsection 363 sale it planned 
to reduce that number to 33 plants by the end of 
2012.  General Motors also planned to cut its North 
American dealership network.  There were over 
6,000 General Motors dealerships before it filed for 
Chapter 11 protection, but the company, after 
restructuring, planned to eventually reduce that 
number to only 4,100 dealerships.  With its new cost 
structure General Motors would have a breakeven 
point at 10 million new car sales.  Before bankruptcy 
proceedings General Motors’ breakeven point was 
over 16 million new car sales.  Initially, the 
restructuring efforts were a success and General 
Motors was able to earn $4.2 billion in the first nine 
months of its initial year after emerging from the 
subsection 363 sale [7]. 
In 2010, General Motors began preparing to go 
public and on November 17, 2010 held its initial 
public offering. It was one of the largest in United 
States history.  It sold 478 million shares of common 
stock at $33 each, raising over $15.7 billion in equity.  
General Motors also sold $4.35 billion in preferred 
shares.  After selling its common stock investment in 
the initial public offering, the United States 
Treasury’s share in General Motors dropped from 
just under 61% to under 33% [3].  The Treasury 
ended up selling its shares in the initial public 
offering for less than it effectively purchased them 
for originally, however.  Considering the Treasury’s 
financing for the company, it effectively purchased 
its 60.8% equity in the company for $43.84 per share, 
therefore losing $4.5 billion on its investment in the 
initial public offering [26].  In order for the Treasury 
to break even on its investment, General Motors’ 
share price would have to rise to $48.58 per share, 
which would bring the total value of the company to 
a level never before attained even before 
restructuring [3].  After selling shares during the 
initial public offering the Treasury pledged not to sell 
additional shares for at least 6 additional months.  
After that time period, the Treasury stated its intent to 
gradually scale back its investment in General 
Motors. 
General Motors has since kept up its solid post-
restructuring performance.  In its 2011 annual report 
General Motors reported that its income before 
income taxes and equity income was $5.895 billion 
and its total net income was $9.287 billion.  In the 
2011 annual report the company posted total 
revenues of $150.276 billion and revenues from 
automotive sales of $148.866 billion [9].  The 
balance sheet in the 2011 annual report showed that 
the company was in much better financial standing 
than it was when it released its 2009 first quarter 
form 10-Q.  General Motors showed $60.287 billion 
in current assets and $144.603 billion in total assets 
in its 2011 annual report, against only $40.932 billion 
in current liabilities and $105.612 billion in total 
liabilities.  The liquidity of General Motors was also 
much improved and in the 2011 annual report 
General Motors reported that it had gained $8.166 
billion in positive cash flows from operating 
activities, $7.429 billion of which was from 
automotive activities.   After filing for bankruptcy 
protection only 3 years earlier, General Motors had a 
credit rating from Standard & Poor of BB+ as of 
March 27, 2012, signaling regained confidence in 
General Motors debt [5].  Since then, GM has 
returned to profitability and the leaner GM is 
forecasting profitability into the foreseeable future. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The bankruptcy of General Motors and its 
fallout continues to be debated economically and 
politically.  It became an issue for the presidential 
election of 2012 with both sides debating the merits 
and process.  It continues to be in the news as 
lawsuits from closed dealerships and environmental 
issues wind their way through the courts.  Old GM 
continues while new GM produces cars.  General 
Motors, from its very beginning has been an 
interesting and important company to the United 
States.   
This paper highlights the consequences a major 
bankruptcy has on stakeholders, especially those who 
may not even know they are at risk.  Often, the 
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effects of bankruptcy are  explored on large 
institutional investors or individuals who 
intentionally purchase the entity’s common stock or 
general unsecured bonds or on the markets in 
general.   But, the bankruptcy of General Motors 
emphasizes that the public’s risk from a major 
bankruptcy goes far beyond these investors.  Many 
stakeholders are affected by a company’s bankruptcy 
without even knowingly taking the risk of a 
company’s financial performance.  Litigants in 
product liability suits against a bankrupt company, 
hurt through no fault of their own actions, may not be 
able to receive compensation for their damages as a 
result of a company going bankrupt.  Consumers, 
who should be focused on vendor product quality and 
price rather than vendor financial performance, may 
not be able to exercise products rights (such as 
warranties or returns) if their vendor declares 
bankruptcy. 
This paper focuses on the effects the General 
Motors bankruptcy, one of the largest in the history 
of the United States, had on stakeholders who took 
no calculated risk before becoming a stakeholder in 
General Motors.  It highlights the effects the 
bankruptcy had on General Motors suppliers, 
dealership owners, employees, consumers and 
product liability litigants.  The paper also discloses 
the investment effects of the General Motors 
bankruptcy, which in this particular case affected 
every American taxpayer.  This paper is important 
because it puts into perspective just how detrimental 
major bankruptcies can be and who can be adversely 
affected.   
Hopefully, the old saying “As General Motors 
Goes So Goes the Nation” is no longer true with 
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